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S.: Alimony--Rights of Divorced Wife to Payments After Death of Divor

CASE COMMENTS
ALIMONY-RIGHTS

OF

DIVORCED

WIFE

TO

PAYMENTS

AFTER

DEATH OF DIVORCED HUSBAND.-P, divorced wife, filed motion for

judgment against executrix of estate of divorced husband to recover payments accruing after husband's death under a decree by
which P had been granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Held,
on appeal, affirming the action of the circuit court in dismissing
the motion, that in the absence of stipulation or contract between
the parties to the contrary, such decree did not survive the death
of the husband to charge his estate with unmatured payments.
Foster v. Foster, 77 S.E.2d 471 (Va. 1953).
The statutes controlling the decision in the case were set out
in the opinion as VA. CODE §§ 20-107, 108 and 109 (Michie, 1950),
whose pertinent provisions are, "Upon decreeing . . . a divorce
. . . the court may make such further decree as it shall deem

expedient concerning the estate and maintenance of the parties,
or either of them, and the care, custody and maintenance of their
minor children. The court may, from time to time afterward...
upon petition of either parent . . . revise and alter such decree
concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children and
make a new decree concerning the same... Upon petition of either
party the court may increase, decrease, or cause to cease any
alimony that may thereafter accrue." The quoted provisions are
virtually the same as those in W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 15
(Michie, 1949).
The decision in the instant case completes a series of four
decided in the two jurisdictions construing the respective statutes
relating to alimony and minor children support payments accruing
after the death of the divorced husband. They have reached a
complete anomaly. The Virginia court has reached the conclusion
that it has no power under the statute to decree alimony payments
to extend beyond the death of the husband, Foster v. Foster,supra,
but does have the power to bind the husband's estate for payments
for the support and maintenance of his minor children which
become due after his death. Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70
S.E.2d 417 (1952). The West Virginia court, on the other hand,
finds the statute gives it power to require that alimony be paid
to the wife throughout her life, Hale v. Hale, 108 W. Va. 837, 150
S.E. 748 (1929), but leaves it unable to bind the husband's estate
for payments accruing after his death for the support and main.
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tenance of his minor children. Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va.
160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948).
Both jurisdictions agree that a contract between the parties,
approved by the court, will survive the husband's death if clearly
expressed in such terms. Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S.E.
482 (1923); Jennings v. First National Bank, 116 W. Va. 409, 180
S.E. 772 (1935).
In the instant case the Virginia court acknowledges that, in
contrast to divorces a mensa et thoro which are controlled by common law, divorces a vinculo matrimonii are wholly creatures of
statute. It expressly finds the Virginia statute not of sufficient
breadth to enable a Virginia court of equity to decree payments
of alimony to extend beyond the husband's death. The theory
upon which it rests its decision is the common law duty of the husband to maintain his wife. When the marriage is dissolved, the
statute is held to create a duty of maintenance in substitution for
that imposed by the common law which ceases with the termination
of the marriage relationship. Since the common law duty does
not survive the husband's death, the court, by analogy, refuses
to extend the statutory duty beyond that time.
The theory of the West Virginia court, as expressed in the
Hale case, is that since the wife's right to participate in the husband's estate is cut off by the divorce decree, the court may, in a
proper case, give the wife a substituted right of participation by
charging the husband's estate for continued alimony payments
after his death. The West Virginia statute was held broad enough
to permit such a decree.
In Morris v. Henry, supra, the Virginia court recognized the
ending at death of the husband's common law duty to provide for
his minor children but pointed out that the needs of the minor
children do not end with the father's death. That where the
family relations remain intact there may be no great danger of his
use of his arbitrary power to disinherit them; but when, through
the father's fault, the family has been broken up, and his children
become in a sense the wards of the court, this power is taken from
him and he may be compelled to give security for their support
that will be binding on his estate; citing with approval, Miller v.
Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874). A denial of such power to a court of
equity would, in some cases, seriously impair its ability to care for
infants.
The West Virginia court, in Robinson v. Robinson, supra,
comes to the opposite conclusion by holding that the decree pro,
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viding for support of minor children in a divorce suit does not
add anything to the father's common law obligation, which ceases
at his death, but merely serves to enforce it; that the only right
such child has in his father's estate is the right of inheritance. The
distinction drawn here is that, while the wife's rights in the husband's estate are cut off by the divorce, the children remain their
father's heirs.
It is to be noted that the statutes of both states apply the same
terms alike to both alimony and child support decrees.
The right to receive and the duty to pay alimony are personal
and genierally considered to terminate on the death of either
party, where no statute to the contrary exists and the decree is
silent on the subject. Many cases hold that courts generally have
the power, under statutes, to provide for the continuance of alimony after the husband's death but, where such power exists, the
decree must expressly provide for such continuation. 27 C.J.S.
§ 240. Alimony payable until the further order of the court does
not survive the husband's death. Lennahan v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill.
620 (1883). The Illinois court held in the same case that it would
take an extraordinary case to justify the postponement of creditors
and heirs to the payment of both alimony and dower, currently,
during the life of the divorced wife (decree of absolute divorce
did not automatically cut off dower in Illinois).
An equity court may decree alimony to be a lien on defendant's
land, Foggin v. Furbee, 89 W. Va. 170, 109 S.E. 754 (1921), though
payable in installments in the future. Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9,
53 S.E. 769 (1906). Decree awarding divorced wife alimony constitutes a lien on divorced husband's realty in West Virginia.
United States v. Spangler, 94 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. W. Va. 1950). The
effect of such a lien is well illustrated in that case. "There is no
way of knowing the exact amount owing under such a decree, as
in the case of an ordinary judgment ordering the payment of a
specified sum. And since the amount of the payments under the
decree may be increased or decreased as the court sees fit, the
ascertainment of the total even by the use of life expectancy tables
is made impossible. Accordingly, such a decree will more frequently than not serve to restrain completely both the transfer
and the incumbrance by the husband of his realty, because all those
whose rights in the husband's land are acquired subsequently in
time to the entry of the decree, having either actual or constructive
notice thereof, are faced with the peril of having their entire equity
therein taken from them by the enforcement of that lien against
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the land.... And there is no clear authority that such a lien may
be discharged by either payment of a fixed sum or transfer of
specific property." Id. at 303.
Owing to the recency of both the Foster and Morris cases, the
question would appear settled in Virginia. However, the West
Virginia cases present a greater uncertainty.
Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S.E. 12 (1890), held
erroneous a decree granting a wife alimony for her life. The Hale
case, in arriving at a contrary holding, made no mention of this
earlier case. Games v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S.E. 560 (1931),
held alimony not to be an estate, nor a portion of the husband's
estate to be assigned to the wife; but merely an allowance out of
his estate. A final decree for future alimony is not a vested
property right. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893 (1940).
The word "alimony" comes from the Latin "alimonia," meaning
sustenance, and means therefore, the sustenance or support of the
wife by her divorced husband and stems from the common-law
right of the wife to support by her husband. Ibid.
The holding in the Hale case, decided in 1929, that alimony
decreed to a wife for life is payable out of the husband's estate after
his death, has been rendered doubtful by this language used in the
more recent Robinson case: "but in view of our more recent decisions on the question, we doubt whether the rule laid down in
the Goff and Hale cases should be applied as the settled law of
this State, in respect to allowing liens to accrue after the death
of a decedent against whom a decree for the payment of money in
installments has been entered." 181 W. Va. at 171, 50 S.E.2d at 461.
"To sum up the whole matter, we are of the opinion that a
decree in a divorce suit against a father, for the payment of money
for the support of his children, becomes ineffective on his death;
and that in the ordinary case, the same rule should apply to an
alimony decree to a wife, though conceding that under the rule
of Hale v. E-ale, supra, situations may arise under which the Court
would be warranted in decreeing alimony for the life of the wife."
Id. at 173. 50 S.E.2d at 462. (Italics supplied.)
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